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ABSTRACT
A structural vector autoregression is employed to estimate the real output level response to
pennanent inflation shocks. We identify themodel by assuming that in the long run, inflation is
a monetary phenomenon. Well-known economic theory is used to establish this identification
restriction. The modelis estimated for a sample of 16 countries from the larger pool based on
data quality, existence oflong uninterrupted series on output and inflation, and evidence that the
country experienced permanent shocks to inflation and output. The VAR is estimated for each
country separately. We find some evidence of nonsuperneutrality, particularly for some low
inflation countries, but in general our results suggest that superneutralitydescribes well most of
the postwar economies we study.
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of the authors.1 Introduction
A key issue in macroeconomics in the past thirty years concerns the concept
of superneutrality. Most economists seem to agree that aone-time perma-
nent change in the level of the money stock should have no long-run effect
on real variables. This is often summarized with the statement that money
is long-run neutral. By this long-run neutrality proposition, a change in the
steady state growth rate ofthe moneystock will cause an identical change in
the steady state rate of inflation. However, there is a continuing theoretical
dispute over the long-run effects of a permanent change in the growth rate
of the money stock on real variables, and particularly on the capital-labor
ratio, the level of real output, and to some extent on the growth rate of
real output. The notion that a one-time permanent change in the rate of
money growth has no long-run effect on these real variables has come to be
summarized in the statement that money is long-run superneutral. In this
paper we will take the ‘long-run’ qualifier to be understood throughout.
General equilibrium growth models ofvarious stripes makeopposite pre-
dictions about superneutrality. The maln arguments havebeen made in the
context of models where the rate of output growth is given exogenously.
Within this class, simple versions of models with money and capital based
on overlapping generations of consumers (with money demand motivated
by the overlapping generations friction) predict that a one-time shift to a
permanently higher rate of money growth will cause a one-time increase in
the level of output. Models with money in the utility function and capital
based on an infinitely-lived representative consumer predict, in simple ver-
sions, that a one-time shift to a permanently higher rate of money growth
will have no effect on the level of output. A similar model with money de-
1mand motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint predicts, again in a simple
version, that the permanently higher money growth rate will be associated
with a lower level of output. Additional arguments have been made in the
context of Romer-Lucas endogenous growth models. Here, a change in the
steady state rate of inflation might have a permanent effect on the growth
rate of output. Some results based on these models with a representative
agent andmoney demand motivated by acash-in-advance constraint predict
that the one-time shift to a permanently higher rate of money growth will
actually lower the output growth rate. Altogether, general equilibrium the-
ories seem to suggest that plausible long-run effects on the level of output
could be positive, zero, or negative; and that plausible effects on the rate of
output growth maybe negative.
In this paper, we conduct a statistical investigation ofsuperneutrality in
a large number of postwar economies. Our test imposes minimal structure
and makes use of the idea that permanent shocks to nominal variables are
necessary to test superneutrality propositions.’ For each country we use
a bivariate vector autoregression composed of the change in inflation and
output growth, and we assume that inflation is a monetary phenomenon
in the long run (that is, we assume money is neutral). We impose this
assumption on the model with the long-run identifying restriction that the
exogenous shock to output growth can have only temporary effects on the
inflation rate. This identifying restriction effectively decomposes inflation
intopermanent and transitorycomponents. Our identificationschemeallows
the effect ofa permanent inflation shock on the level of output to be positive,
zero, or negative. We therefore interpret our statistical model as a test of
For an extensive discussion of this idea, see Fisher and Seater (1993).
2superneutrality.
We collect annual data on inflation and output from a large pooi of
countries which meet the followingcriteria: (a) adata quality ranking of ‘C-’
or better from Summers and Heston (1991), and (b) at least 25 consecutive
years ofdata on both time series. There are 58 countries that meet these two
criteria in our sample. We divide these countries into a number of groups
according to results from a standard battery of tests for nonstationarity.
According to these unit root tests, 16 countries haveexperienced permanent
shocks to inflation and the level of output. We estimate our VAR for these
cases. For 11 of these 16 countries, the estimated long-run response of
the level of real output to a permanent inflation shock is not significantly
differentfrom zero. For 4o fthe remaining 5 countries, the long-run response
is positive and statistically significant.2 For the remaining country the point
estimateof the long-run response is negative andstatistically significant; this
effect occurs for the country with the highest in-sample average inflation
rate.3 We note, more generally, that our estimated long-run response tends
to be lower or negative for countries with high average inflation rates over
the sample.
An additional 9 countries out of the 58 in our sample have experienced
permanent shocks to inflation but not to the level of output according to
standard tests. These results imply that the permanent inflation shocks did
not have permanent effects on the level of output. Hence, these countries
provide direct evidence of superneutrallty.4
There are 31 countries that have not experienced permanent inflation
2The four countries are Germany, Austria, the UK, and Finland.
3This country is Argentina.
4By ‘direct’ we mean that it is not necessary to run a VAR to test for superneutrality
in these cases.
3shocks according to standard unit root tests. These countries are uninfor-
mative about superneutrality since they exhibit no evidence of permanent
shocks to inflation. The remaining two countries are special cases which we
discuss later.5
We interpret these results as suggesting that, broadly speaking, su-
perneutrality seems to describe well the postwar experience for most of
the countries for which our methodology can be applied. While our su-
perneutrality results are only with respect to real output, we think this is
the variable of greatest interest to many economists. To the extent that
superneutrality is violated, we find that it is mostly on the positive side,
with apermanent increase in inflation associated with apermanent increase
in the level of output, and that this effect tends to occur for countries with
lower average inflation in sample. This result is consistent with theories
which predict Mundell-Tobin effects at low steady state inflation rates, but
where the effect dissipates at higher steady state inflation rates.6
We alsohaveresults bearingon the question ofwhether the long-run rate
of growth ofoutput might be affected when the steady state rate ofinflation
increases, as it can be in endogerious growth models. In our framework, tests
of this hypothesis require that there be permanent shocks to the growth
rate of output as well as permanent shocks to inflation. For only one of
the 58 countries do we find unit root test results that support this joint
hypothesis. According to our tests, almost every country that experienced
permanent inflation shocks did not experience permanent changes in output
growth. Hence these results provide considerable direct evidence in favor of
5Theoretical results in Fisher and Seater (1993) are particularly useful for interpreting
the evidence for these countries.
6See Azariadis and Smith (1993) for an example of atheory that makes predictions of
this type.
4superneutrality with respect to output growth rates.7
Other empirical work related to the superneutrality question has typi-
cally either focused on atime series analysis of a single country or studied
the determinants of growth in a cross-sectional analysis for a large number
of countries. Among the time series studies, our work is most closely related
to Fisher and Seater (1993) and King and Watson (1992), who use the no-
tion of permanent shocks to devise tests of neutrality and superneutrality
propositions. King and Watson (1992) find evidence of nonsuperneutrality
for the postwar U.S. using differenced output and twice differenced money
in a bivariate vector autoregression. We note, following Fisher and Seater
(1993), that neutrality is necessary but not sufficient for superneutrality,
and we take advantage of this fact in our test by assuming money growth
is reflected only in the inflation rate in the long run. An advantage to
our specification is that it uses well-established macroeconomic theory and
avoidstrying to select the ‘correct’ definition of money.8
Fisher and Seater (1993) also provide discussions of other time series
studies. They interpret Geweke (1986) and Lucas (1980) as providing evi-
dence in favor of neutrality but as being uninformative with regard to su-
perneutrality. They also interpret Kormendi and Meguire (1984) as provid-
ing evidence ofneutrality for43 countries andsuperneutrality for4 countries,
again based on the notion that permanent shocksare necessary to test these
propositions.
The large literature on the determinants of real output growth based
TWe find evidence of permanent shocks to output growth in four countries. Three of
these are uninformative regarding superneutrality. The fourth is one of our special cases.
8The King and Watson (1992) evidence may be sensitive to the definition ofmoney. An
advantage to their approach is the broad range of identification assumptions considered,
but this does not seem practical for our study which examines alarge number of countries.
5on analyses of a cross-section of countries has been summarized by Levine
and Renelt (1992). While some authors have reported that inflation is nega-
tively related to output growth in such regressions, Levine and Renelt (1992)
conclude that such inferences are fragile.
In the next section of the paper, wecontrast the various resultsthat have
been obtained in general equilibrium models with money on the question of
superneutrality. We then present our statistical model and, in the following
section, we present our data and implementation. The subsequent section
discusses the results, andthe final section provides summary comments.
2 Superneutrality
In this section, we outline four general equilibrium theories, each of which
illustrates a different conclusion on the question of superneutrality. We
sketch these theories not to provide a comprehensive review but simply to
motivate our test as well as our identification scheme.9 As is well known,
general equilibrium models do not easily admit equilibria in which money
has value,andtherefore the general conclusion from the theoretical literature
is that results depend to a large extent on the way in which a demand for
real balances is motivated.’0
We begin by illustrating a version of the Mundell-Tobin effect in an
n-period overlapping generations model with money and capital.’1 In this
economy, time runsfrom the infinitepast to the infinitefuture. Overlapping
generations of agents, identical except for birth dates, live for n periods and
9For a recent survey on superneutrality, see Orphanides and Solow (1990).
~°As noted by Orphanides and Solow (1990), the comment of Stein (1970) has held
up quite well: “My main conclusion is that equally plausible models yield fundamentally
different results.”
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bychoice of consumption, c, andleisure, 1. Here subscripts denote birthdates
and parentheses denote real time. The parameter ‘y is the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, /3 = (1+p)1 is the discount factor, where pi sthe net
rate of time preference, and ij is a parameter that controls the share of time
devoted to market activity. The labor force grows at gross rate ~‘. A large
number of identical firms produce output usinginputs of capital, K(t), and
labor, L(t), according to
Y(t) =
where Y(t) is output and k(t) is the capital-labor ratio. Herec~ is the capital
share and )~.is the gross rate of technological progress. The government
provides high-powered money, H(t), according to
H(t) = OH(t — 1),
where 0> 1 is the gross rate of money creation. Government consumption
based on the revenue from money creation is endogenous, and the govern-
ment uses the revenue to purchase goods at market prices without affecting
the utility maps of the agents.
In any steady state of this model, output grows at the constant gross
rate .A’~b. Agents can save by holding money or by renting capital to the
firms, and an arbitrage condition equates the rate of return across all assets.
A steady state may exist where agents hold the government-issued money
voluntarily. At such a monetary steady state, the gross real rate of interest
7is given by
B = A’çb0~
and the capital-labor ratio is given by
k(i) = At’ {R -1+
The comparative statics indicate that a one-time permanent increase in the
gross rate of money creation, 0, will permanently raise the inflation rate,
permanently lower the real rate of interest, permanently raise the capital-
labor ratio, andpermanently raisethe level ofoutput. The monetary steady
state is afull Pareto optimum if0 = 1. This corresponds to aFriedman rule
where prices fall at a rate sufficient to make the rate of return on money
equalto the growth rate of the economy. Positive rates of currency creation
are therefore welfare reducing.
A second type of general equilibrium model with money and capital
starts from somewhat differentpremises andreaches adifferent conclusion.’2
In this case we begin with a representative family which is growing over
(continuous) time at net rate n. Money confers utility directly so that the
family maximizes
W =j u(ct,mt)e~6tdt
by choosing consumption, c, and real balances, m. The function u(.) rep-
resents felicity at the instant t and 6i sthe rate of time preference. The
family allocates savings between capital holdings and money holdings. The
necessary conditions for an interior solution to this problem imply that the
net real rate of interest is equal to the marginal product of capital which is
‘2For details on this model, see Sidrauski (1967).
8given by
f’(k)=6+n.
Thus the real rateof interest is in the steady state independent ofthe growth
rate of the money stock and of the inflation rate. A one-time permanent
increase in the rate of growth of the money stock would have no effect
on the capital-labor ratio, the level of output, or the output growth rate.
Money is superneutral in this model. Positive rates of money creation are
again welfarereducing, provided atechnical condition on the utility function
holds.
A third general equilibrium model begins with adiscrete time formula-
tion of an infinitely-lived representative agent’s maximization problem
max>1/3tU(Cj)
where U is a standard utility function, C is consumption, and /3 E (0, 1)
is the discount factor.’3 The agent maximizes utility subject to a budget
constraint
f(K~)+Mt_~Tt—C~—K~+,+(1—6)K~—~-=0
and a liquidity or cash-in-advance constraint
M~_, + Tj ,~ / i C\ 77
p Ut + J:lt+1 —— ojn,~
where K is capital, f(.) is aproduction function, 6 E (0, 1) is the deprecia-
tion rate, P,~is the price level, M~...1is beginning of period nominal money
holdings, rj is additional money given to the agent at the beginning of time
t, and M~ is the end-of-period moneyholdings of the agent. The agent again
allocates asset holdings between capital and money.
13For details on this model, see Stockman (1981).
9Since there is no growth in this model, the capital stock andthe level of
output are constant in the steady state. If the government issues money at
gross rate 0 according to
M~ =
the first order and market clearing conditions imply that
— 0[1 — (1 — Jk 1 /32
Thus, the comparative statics indicate that higher rates of money creation
(higher inflation rates in this model) imply a higher real interest rate, a
lower level of the capital stock and alower level of output. Inflation is again
welfare reducing.
Finally, it is possible to analyze the effects of movingto a higher steady
state inflation rate in a Lucas-Romer type endogenous growth model. The
potential forimportant effects is magnified in these modelsbecause inflation
might change the rate ofoutput growth instead of merely the level. Gomme
(1993) builds and simulates amodel of this type witharepresentative agent
and money demand motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint. Gomme’s
(1993) numerical calculations suggest that the effects of higher inflation on
the output growth rate are negative in such amodel, and we will take this as
a working prediction for the purposes ofthis paper. We note, however, that
Gomme (1993) predicts the growth rate effect will be small forthe range of
inflation rates we observe in our sample of 58 countries.14
We take these models seriously as representing the state of theoretical
knowledge concerning superneutrality. We present these models in order to
14There is a large literature on other possible sets of assumptions (money in the pro-
duction function, for instance) and the associated implications for inflation and growth,
but the models sketched above provide examples with the starkest contrasts.
10make several points concerning the nature of the claims they make about
superneutrality. First, even though all the models involve general equilib-
rium, continuous market clearing calculations, they make sharply different
predictions with respect to the effect of an increased inflation rate on out-
put. This provides anatural motivation for atest to distinguish betweenthe
models on the basis of these differing predictions. Second, all of thesemod-
els embody the long-run neutrality of money: In the steady state, the rate
of inflation is determined by the rate ofmoney growth. This helps motivate
our maintained assumption that money is long-run neutral.’5 Third, in each
case the arguments are couched in terms of steady state comparisons—one
steady state with low moneygrowth and lowinflation versus another steady
state with higher money growth and higher inflation. All ignore transition
dynamics. Thus these arguments are best thought of as long run in nature,
so that any imposition of monetary neutrality should only be in the long
run. This is exactly what our identification assumption accomplishes. Fi-
nally, and perhaps most importantly, all effects of higher money growth in
these models come through higher inflation rates. This is whywe focus on
inflation instead of money growth in our bivariate VAR.16 We now turn to
our test of superneutrality.
3 VAR identification
Blanchard and Quah (1989) develop a statistical model that decomposes
output movements into permanent and transitory components. Our model
performs a comparable decomposition for inflation. We use a bivariate time
15There is also considerable empirical evidence favoring this view.
‘6Our focus on inflation also has the side benefit of allowing us to sidestep the question
of the definition of money.
11series model consisting of the change in the rate of inflation, i~ir, and the
change in the logarithm of real output, L~,.y.In this framework, one shock is
associated with permanent changes in inflation andone is restricted to have
only temporary effects on inflation. The permanent inflation shock, 1r, is
attributed to permanent changes in the growth rate of the money supply
following Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation is everywhere
and alwaysamonetary phenomenon.”7 Friedman’s statement is areference
to trend behavior in inflation, not a claim about every cyclical fluctuation:
This permanent inflation shock will permanently affect the level of output
if superneutrality is not a property of the macroeconomy. We estimate this
long-run effect for all countries in our Group A, described in more detail
in the next section. The temporary shock to inflation, cY, is permitted to
have apermanent effect on output. For example, ifthe temporary inflation
shock is an adverseaggregate supply disturbance that temporarily raises the
inflation rate, output could permanently fallrelative to its trend.
Equations (1)and (2)illustratethe moving averagerepresentation (MAR)
of the bivariate time series model:
= 0,,(L) ~ + 0,2(L)c~ (1)
= 021(L)c~ + 022(L)e1. (2)
Eachlag operator has the general form ofequation (3)with each °ijka scalar
parameter:
0~,(L)= EoijkLk, (3)
for i = 1,2 andj = 1,2. The model is identified by two restrictions. First,
we restrict the long-run multiplier for ~o n i r to be identically equal to zero
‘TRoberts (1993) uses a similar identifying assumption.
12because this shock is not allowed to have a permanent effect on inflation.
Restricting the sum of the parameters in the 012(L) lag polynomial to zero
achieves this condition:
012(1) = >0,2k = 0. (4)
If permanent movements in inflation are caused by permanent changes in
money growth, the transitory inflation shock will primarily result from non-
monetary disturbances.’8 Identification requires some assumption about
the covariance between the two disturbances. Given that these shocks are
thought to originate primarily from different sectors of the economy, our
second restriction is that the disturbances are uncorrelated.
This model is easilyestimated usingBlanchard andQuah’s (1989) method.




0(L) = [ ~~ ]
Pre-multiply (5) by 0(L)’, under the assumption that 0(L) is invertible,19
and premultiply the resulting expression by 0~ (= 0(L)IL=o) to obtain the
VAR representation,
= Ut. (6)
‘8The temporary shock to inflation could also account for monetary factors which have
only temporary effects on inflation. We assume that this source of temporary inflation is
less important.
~9Lippi and Reichlin (1993) and Blanchard and Quah (1993) discuss manyissues perti-
nent to non-invertibility.
13The VAR coefficients, /3(L), are afunction of the parameters from the struc-
tural MAR,
j3(L) = 000(L)1, (7)
and the vector of VAR innovations, Ut, is a function of the structural dis-
turbances and the contemporaneous parameters, Oo:
Ut = O0 t. (8)
Long-run multipliers, 0(1), are related to the sum of VAR coefficients, /3(1),
and the contemporaneous parameters according to
/3(1) = OoO(1)’. (9)
The covariance matrix of innovations is derived by assuming the covariance
matrix for structural disturbances is the identity matrix20
= ~ (10)
Solving (9) for 0~, inserting this expression into (10) and simplifying yields
= 0(1)0(1)T. (11)
The VAR provides the information contained in the left side of this expres-
sion. Our assumptions for long-run multipliers and the covariance matrix
for shocks imply that 0(1) is alower triangular matrix. Hence, the Choleski
decomposition of the left side of (11) identifies the parameters in 0(1). Then
we obtain 0~ from (9) and 0(L) from (7).
20Alternatively, we could normalize the diagonal elements in 0(1) to equal unity and
estimate a diagonal covariance matrix for the structural shocks. These normalizations
have no effect on our results.
14Our primary purpose is to estimate the long-run response of output to
a permanent one percentage point increase in inflation, e, which is derived
from elements in the matrix oflong-run multipliers,
e= ~ (12)
This long-run response is related to the long-run derivative that Fisher and
Seater (1993) have investigated, although in their model money growth is
not decomposed into permanent and temporary components. An advantage
to our approach is that the empirical MAR provides structural information
if the identifying assumptions are appropriate. Under this assumption, we
can use the effects of the permanent inflation shock on output and inflation
to assessthe short-run andlong-run consequencesof apermanent increase in
moneygrowth. We are also able to use the empirical model to inferwhether
the temporary inflation shocks appear to be aggregate supply disturbances
and to quantify their effects using variance decompositions.
4 Implementation
4.1 Data
The data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) data base.
We use annual data on real gross domestic product and the gross domestic
product deflator for each country. We begin with all of the countries listed
on the data base and we apply two criteriato chooseasubset ofcountries for
whichwe argue our model may provide a reasonable test of superneutrality.
Our first criterion is data quality. We remove countries from the sample
that do not meet our minimum quality standard, which we define as a data
15Country Years Grade Country Years Grade
Argentina 1961-87 C Australia 1960-92 A-
Austria 1964-92 A- Belgium 1960-92 A
Bolivia 1961-85 C Botswana 1964-91 C
Brazil 1963-91 C- Canada 1960-92 A-
Chile 1961-92 C Costa Rica 1960-91 C
Cyprus 1960-91 C Denmark 1960-91 A-
Dom. Rep. 1963-91 C Ecuador 1965-91 C
El Salvador 1960-92 C Finland 1960-92 A-
France 1960-92 A Germany 1960-92 A
Greece 1960-91 A- Guatemala 1960-92 C
Honduras 1960-92 C Iceland 1960-92 B+
India 1960-90 C Indonesia 1964-92 C
Iran 1964-90 C- Ireland 1960-90 A-
Italy 1961-90 A Jamaica 1961-90 C
Japan 1960-90 A Korea 1960-92 B-
Luxembourg 1960-92 A- Malta 1960-89 C
Mexico 1960-91 C Morocco 1964-91 C-
Netherlands 1960-92 A New Zealand 1960-90 A-
Norway 1960-92 A- Pakistan 1960-92 C-
Panama 1960-92 C Paraguay 1960-91 C
Peru 1961-89 C Phillipines 1960-92 C
Portugal 1966-91 A- Singapore 1961-92 C
South Africa 1960-92 C- Spain 1960-91 A-
Sri Lanka 1960-92 C- Sweden 1960-92 A-
Switzerland 1960-92 B+ Syria 1963-91 C-
Tanzania 1965-91 C- Thailand 1960-90 C-
Trin.-Tobago 1966-91 C Tunisia 1968-92 C-
Turkey 1960-90 C U.K. 1960-92 A
U.S. 1960-92 A Venezuela 1960-92 C
Table 1: Countries, years of data, and data quality rating according to
Summers and Heston (1991).
16quality ranking of ‘C-’ or better from Summers and Heston (1991).21 Our
second criterion is that the country has along continuous set ofobservations
on the twotime series. Since our identification schemeis based on along-run
restriction, we require enough data to plausibly claim that wecan estimate
a long-run phenomenon. We define the standard for the purposes of this
paper as 25 years of annual observations. There are a total of 58 countries
that meet these two criteria; these countries, the years of data available, and
their data quality ratings are listed in Table 1.
4.2 Tests for nonstationarity
We denote the order of integration of a variable by (x), so that if xi s
integrated oforder £, wewrite (x) = £. For our test of superneutraiity to be
applicable, the time series from a particular country must be characterized
by permanent shocks to the inflation rate and to the level of output; that
is, we require (ir) = 1 and (y) = 1. We call the set of countries whose time
series meet this criterion the ‘Group A’ countries.
In order to determine which countries belong in Group A, we apply aug-
mented Dickey-Fullerregressions to test forunit roots in the two time series
foreach country.22 We runa set often regressionsfor each variable specified
as follows. The first five are run with a constant and 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 lags.
The second five are run with a constant, a deterministic trend, and 0, 1,
2, 3, or 4 lags. The adjusted Box-Ljung Q test statistic is calculated for
serial correlation of orders 1, 2, 3, and 4 in each regression. We analyze the
21We use IFS data instead of data from Summers and Heston (1991) because the de-
flators on the IFS data base measure the changes in the price level that are actually
experienced in a country. Deflators from the Summers and Heston (1991) data could be
affected by international events that had little effect on a country’s price index.
220ur methodology is a variation on that suggested by Cambell and Perron (1991).
17Country Var. Lags ~ ~ Lags ~
Argentina y 1 -0.91 -1.54 1 -2.05 -7.41
0 -1.99 -6.94 0 -2.79 -14.23
Australia y 0 -2.52 -0.83 0 -0.87 -2.03
1 -2.10 -5.70 1 -1.59 -4.72
Austria y 0 -2.55 -0.92 0 -1.46 -2.61
0 -1.91 -7.08 0 -2.12 -8.45
Chile y 0 0.04 0.05 0 -1.53 -6.30
1 -2.61 -7.28 1 -2.71 -7.77
Costa Rica y0 -1.94 -0.86 0 -0.74 -1.48
0 -2.26 -9.43 0 -2.95 -14.59
Cyprus y 0 -0.62 -0.65 0 -2.25 -9.29
0 -2.18 -7.80 0 -1.93 -7.88
Finland y 1 -1.58 -0.80 1 -0.92 -3.99
0 -2.09 -9.28 0 -2.12 -9.42
Germany y 0 -2.22 -0.95 0 -1.86 -4.19
0 -2.25 -9.13 0 -2.19 -9.38
Iceland y 1 -2.21 -1.32 1 -2.46 -9.21
0 -1.63 -5.90 0 -1.29 -5.14
Ireland y 1 0.33 0.11 1 -2.64 -9.07
0 -2.18 -9.87 0 -2.00 -9.24
Japan y 1 -2.47 -0.85 1 -1.77 -2.06
0 -2.34 -9.69 0 -2.65 -12.35
Mexico y 1 -2.52 -0.95 1 -0.99 -1.44
0 -1.80 -5.76 0 -2.24 -11.75
Portugal y 0 -2.50 -1.40 0 -2.32 -5.45
0 -1.95 -5.54 0 -1.61 -5.82
Spain y 1 -1.78 -0.65 1 -1.79 -1.88
0 -2.31 -7.84 0 -2.11 -7.26
U.K. y 1 -1.39 -0.81 1 -2.84 -10.56
0 -2.15 -8.36 0 -2.02 -8.11
U.S. y 0 -2.34 -1.04 1 -3.00 -9.17
__________ _____ 0 -1.87 -5.42 0 -1.48 -4.46
Table 2: Unit root test results for Group A countries. We fail to reject a
unit root in either series by any of the four tests.
18results beginning with the regressions with the maximum lag, checkingthe
Q-statistics for significance at the 10% level. We proceed to the regression
with the lag length reduced by oneunless doing so means that one or more
of the Q-statistics for that regression is significant, in which case we stay
at the longer lag length. If this sequential procedure arrives at zero lags
without finding any evidence of serial correlation in the augmented regres-
sions, we use the (unaugmented) Dickey-Fuller regression to perform unit
root diagnostics. This process leads us to choose a lag length of 0 or 1 in
most cases. Once the lag length is decided, we examine the results from
the Dickey-Fuller “t-test” for that regression at the 10% level (critical value
-2.63 for ~ and -3.24 for i,.) and for the normalized bias test at the 10%
level (critical value -10.2 for ~ and -15.6 for ,5,.). If both tests fail to reject
a unit root for both inflation and output (with and without trend), we in-
clude the country in Group A. This process leads us to a set of 16 Group A
countries. Table 2 summarizes these results for Group A countries.
Using a similar process, weare able to reject the hypothesis that (ir) = 3
for any country, and alsothat (y) = 3 for any country. We are also able to
reject the hypothesis that (ir) = 2 for every country except Peru, and we
can reject the hypothesis that (y) = 2 for all countries except Bolivia, El
Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Malta.
With this information in hand, we divide the countries not in Group
A into three groups. The first is a group of nine countries where we find
evidence of permanent shocks to inflation but not to output. We call these
the Group B countries. The second is a group of 31 countries where we
find no evidence of permanent inflation shocks. We call these the Group C
countries. The two remaining countries are put in aspecial Group D. Tables































































































































Table 3: Unit root test resultsfor Group B countries. A unit root in inflation
cannot be rejected by any test, but aunit root in the level of output is always
rejected by one test, ~.




































Table 4: Unit root test results for Group D, which consists of two special
cases. A unit root in the change in inflation cannot be rejected for Peru,
while a unit root in output growth cannot be rejected for Bolivia. The root
in inflation for Bolivia appears to be explosive, but (ir) = 2i srejected.
20Country Lags ,ô,~ Lags ~
Botswana 0 -4.01 -20.44 0 -4.31 -24.10
Dom. Rep. 0 -1.25 -5.11 0 -3.29 -17.11
Ecuador 0 -1.81 -6.43 0 -4.00 -20.76
El Salvador 0 -2.83 -12.30 0 -4.27 -26.17
Guatemala 0 -3.07 -14.70 0 -4.55 -27.37
Honduras 0 -2.89 -13.72 0 -3.48 -18.97
India 1 -3.67 -25.42 2 -3.68 -31.73
Indonesia 1 -13.26 -15.25 3 -5.01 -20.51
Iran 0 -3.35 -15.60 0 -3.60 -18.47
Jamaica 0 -2.43 -9.99 1 -4.00 -23.26
S. Korea 0 -2.29 -9.98 0 -3.22 -15.73
Luxembourg 0 -4.74 -26.54 0 -4.66 -26.64
Malta 0 -2.72 -12.24 0 -2.79 -12.98
Morocco 0 -4.44 -23.20 0 -4.55 -24.65
Netherlands 0 -2.55 -11.50 0 -3.30 -15.69
New Zealand 0 -3.15 -16.57 0 -3.01 -17.25
Norway 0 -2.54 -11.97 0 -2.43 -11.67
Pakistan 0 -2.55 -11.24 0 -2.56 -11.78
Paraguay 0 -2.03 -7.57 0 -3.27 -18.23
Phillipines 0 -4.05 -22.40 0 -4.38 -25.20
Singapore 0 -2.76 -12.46 0 -2.68 -12.43
S. Africa 0 -1.96 -6.53 0 -3.10 -16.90
Sri Lanka 0 -2.91 -13.38 0 -3.46 -19.07
Switzerland 0 -2.75 -13.23 0 -2.88 -14.04
Syria 0 -3.25 -16.14 0 -3.86 -22.36
Tanzania 0 -1.48 -4.65 0 -3.35 -16.92
Thailand 0 -2.86 -13.47 0 -2.85 -13.88
Trin. and Tob. 0 -2.94 -13.86 0 -3.03 -14.46
Tunisia 0 -3.48 -16.33 0 -3.36 -16.24
Turkey 1 -1.91 -6.50 1 -4.16 -20.68
Venezuela 0 -3.45 -18.09 0 -5.16 -30.21
Table 5: Unit root test results for inflation only, Group C. A unit root in
inflation is rejected by at least one test in all cases.
213, 4, and 5 present the results for Groups B, C, and D.
5 Results
5.1 Group A countries
We use data from each of the countries in Group A to empirically address
the superneutrality question. Our statistical model identifiespermanent and
transitory shocks to inflation using the VAR. The VAR lag specifications
were selected by the modified likelihood ratio statistic of Sims (1980). In
some cases, detrending of one or both variables in the VAR was necessary.
We decided whether to detrend a variable using the following procedure.
We ran a set of five regressions for each time series. The regressions had a
constant, atrend, and 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 lags as explanatory variables. For each
regression, we calculated the Box-Ljung Q test statistic for serialcorrelation
at orders 1, 2, 3, and 4. We began interpreting the output by looking at the
regression with the most lagged dependent variables. If the Box-Ljung tests
indicated serial correlation of anyorder for the regression with one less lag,
westayed at the longer lag length. Otherwise weproceeded to the regression
with one less lagged dependent variable. Once we decided on a lag length
via this process, we examined the i-statistic on the trend variable. If it was
significantly different from zero, we concluded that the variable needed to
be detrended before being put in the VAR.23
We begin with a discussion of the long-run response of output to a per-
manent inflation shock. This response (and the associated impulse response
23Thenumberoflagsin the VARandthe detrended variables are asfollows: Argentina 2;
Australia 3,L~, detrended; Austria 1,i~ydetrended; Chile 2; Costa Rica 1, L~y detrended;
Cyprus 1; Finland 4; Germany 1, i~y detrended; Iceland 1, LIydetrended; Ireland 2; Japan
4, i.~ydetrended; Mexico 5, ~y detrended; Portugal 3, i~yand i~x detrended; Spain 1;
United Kingdom 2; United States 1, tiy detrended.
22function) is the primary focus of our test. The estimated long-run response
and the associated 90% confidence bounds are displayed graphically in Fig-
ure 1.24 In this figure, the countries are in increasing order of in-sample
average inflation on the horizontal axis.25 The point estimate of the long-
run response is marked by a short horizontal line associated with each coun-
try, and the width of the 90% confidence interval is marked by the length
of the straight vertical line for each country. For 11 of the 16 Group A
countries, the estimated 90% confidence interval includes zero, and based
on this result we conclude that superneutrality provides a good description
of the postwar experience in these countries. For four countries, Austria,
Germany, Finland, and the United Kingdom, we conclude that superneu-
trality is violated, and that a permanent increase in inflation is associated
with a positive, permanent, and statistically significant increase in the level
of output. One country, Argentina, experienced on average a statistically
significant and permanent negative level effect on output in response to per-
manent inflation shocks. We note that, with a 90% confidence level and
16 countries, we expect to find one or two statistically significant estimates
based on sampling variation alone.
In Figure 2, we summarize the sense in which higher in-sample average
inflation seems to be associated with lower point estimates of the long-run
response of output to a permanent inflation shock. Here the natural loga-
rithm ofinflation is indexed on the horizontal axis, and our point estimates
of the long-run response are indexed on the vertical axis. The downward
24The confidence bounds are obtained using Runkle’s (1987) bootstrap procedure with
1000 replications using random draws (with replacement) from the actual residuals. 25The in-sample average inflation rates for the 16 Group A countries are Argentina
145.6%, Australia 6.9%, Austria 4.8%, Chile 83.7%, Costa Rica 15.0%, Cyprus 5.8%,
Finland 7.8%, Germany 4.0%, Iceland 26.0%, Ireland 8.8%, Japan 5.1%, Mexico 29.2%,
Portugal 14.8%, Spain 10.6%, United Kingdom 8.0%, United States 5.0%.
23sloping line in the figure is afitted regression line used to visually summarize
the relationship. The regression line crosses zero at apoint that corresponds
to about a 43% annual inflation rate. We conclude that our point estimates
tend to be higher for countries with lower in-sample average inflation rates.
Some economists may believe that permanent inflation shocks obtain
from adverse supply disturbances. The centralbank mayoff-set these shocks
by permanently raising the money growth rate thus raising inflation to a
permanently higher level. Similarly, the monetary authority may allow in-
flation to permanently fall following a beneficial supply disturbance. This
story, however, predicts a negative relationship between permanent move-
ments in inflation and output, a prediction that is not supported by most
of our point estimates.
Next we turn to a discussion of the impulse response functions. Figures
3, 4, and 5 present three sets of impulse response functions in the set of 16
Group A countries. We report standardized responses, whereby the impulse
responses of each variable are divided by the standard error for that vari-
able’s residual. Figure 3 presents the results for Germany, one of the four
countries with a positive and statistically significant long-run response.26
Here inflation rises initially and remains permanently higher following a
permanent inflation shock. The level of output also rises and remains per-
manently higher following such ashock. In the face of a temporary inflation
shock, the initial response of inflation is positive and significantly different
from zero, but ultimately the response is zero, reflecting our identifying as-
sumption. The level of output falls in response to a temporary inflation
shock. This last impulse response, which is common across all 16 countries
26The results for Germany are qualitatively unchanged if the sample is truncated in
1989, the year before German reunification.
24in Group A, leads us to characterize the temporary inflation shock in the
model as an adverse supply disturbance.27
Most countries do not display the positive and statistically significant
long-run output response toapermanent inflation shockthat Germany does.
More typical results are like those presented in Figure 4, which displays
impulse response functions for the United States. Here the responses of
inflation to a permanent inflation shock, inflation to a temporary inflation
shock, and output to a temporary inflation shock are qualitatively similar
to the German case presented in Figure 3. But the output response to
a permanent inflation shock is now statistically significant only at a short
horizon.
Figure 5 displays the impulse response functions for a high inflation
country, Chile. In this casethe response ofinflation to apermanent inflation
shock is positive andstatistically significant, and the response of output to a
temporaryinflation shock is negative andstatistically significant; both these
responses are consistent with the analogous functions plotted in Figures 3
and 4. The response of inflation to a temporary inflation shock is significant
only in the second year and is eventually zero by the identifying restriction.
Output responds in a negative but not quite statistically significant way to
a permanent inflation shock at moderate to long horizons.
Comparing Figures 3, 4, and 5, then, we conclude that these countries
differ primarilyin the way output responds to a permanent inflation shock.
This theme holds across the impulse response functions for the remaining 13
Group A countries. These functions are plotted in Appendix A. A summary
27Tkis result is interesting in the context of Faust and Leeper (1994). They discuss
inference problems associated with aggregating different kinds of structural disturbances.
One would not expect this empirical finding for each country ifthe temporary shock were
subject to these aggregation problems.
25of the variance decompositions for the Group A countries is provided in
Tables 6 and 728
5.2 Groups B, C, and D
Our VAR test of superneutrality is valid only forcountries that haveexperi-
enced both permanent shocks to inflation andpermanent shocks to the level
ofoutput. Of the 42 countries not in Group A, afew are informative regard-
ing superneutrality eventhough our test cannot be applied. This is because
some have experienced, according to our unit root diagnostics, permanent
shocksto inflationbut no permanent shocksto the level ofoutput. We inter-
pret this as direct evidence of superneutrality.29 The nineGroup B countries
fitinto this category. If we combine the evidence from Groups A and B, we
conclude that superneutrality describes well the postwar experience of 20
out of the 25 countries in these two groups.
There are 31 Group C countries for which we cannot claim evidence of
permanent inflation shocks. These countries are uninformative regarding
superneutrality, because we cannot infer the response to policy changes that
did not occur.30
Finally, there are two special cases which we categorized in Group D.
The first of these is Peru, for which we find (ir) = 2 and (y) = 1. We
follow Fisher and Seater (1993) and interpret this as direct evidence for
28We provide results based on the permanent inflation shock because the effects of this
shock are our primary concern. The point estimate for the variance explained by the
temporary shock is equal to 100 less the point estimate of the variance explained by the
permanent shock. Similarly, the lower 90 percent confidence bound can be calculated by
subtracting the upper bound for the permanent shock from~ 100, and the upper bound by
subtracting the lower bound for the permanent shock from 100.
29We follow Fisher and Seater (1993) in this interpretation. Again, by ‘direct’ we mean
that it is not necessary to devise atest to come to this conclusion.
30We again follow Fisher and Seater (1993) in this interpretation.
26Country
Horizon
1 2 4 81 6
Argentina 28 24 36 36 36
(2,66) (2,60) (8,71) (7,72) (7,72)
Australia 17 14 17 97
(0,64) (1,64) (2,67) (4,56) (3,55)
Austria 57 54 54 53 53
(51,86) (18,83) (16,83) (15,83) (14,83)
Chile 0014 19 19
(0,37) (0,41) (4,65) (3,70) (2,72)
Costa Rica 12 23 29 31 32




(0,60) (1,49) (1,47) (0,48) (0,47)
Germany 61 53 48 46 45
(26,88) (20,82) (15,79) (12,78) (11,78)
Iceland 00 0 00
(0,38) (0,39) (0,41) (0,42) (0,43)
Ireland 7817 18 19
(0,42) (0,46) (1,58) (1,61) (1,62)
Japan 79 65 55 54 55
(13,100) (9,95) (7,91) (6,93) (5,93)
Mexico 46 33 28 19 15
(2,93) (2,87) (3,85) (4,85) (7,86)
Portugal 83 610 10
(0,65) (2,57) (3,67) (3,72) (3,76)
Spain 48 43 41 39 39
(2,92) (2,88) (2,86) (1,86) (1,86)
United Kingdom 46 46 45 45 45
(11,78) (11,77) (9,79) (8,80) (7,81)
United States 21 8421
(0,63) (2,40) (2,32) (1,32) (1,31)
Table 6: Percent of output variance attributed to a permanent inflation
shock. The 90 percent confidence bounds are in parentheses below each
point estimate. The horizon is in years.
27Country
Horizon
1 2 4 81 6
Argentina 98 97 95 95 96
(85,100) (86,99) (81,99) (82,99) (82,100)
Australia 70 88 93 93 96
(17,99) (48,98) (66,99) (72,99) (80,100)
Austria 61 83 92 96 98
(21,88) (62,94) (81,97) (90,99) (95,99)
Chile 93 89 95 96 98
(66,100) (62,99) (81,100) (86,100) (91,100)
Costa Rica 84 91 95 97 98
(40,99) (65,100) (78,100) (87,100) (93,100)
Cyprus 99 99 100 100 100
(79,100) (84,100) (91,100) (95,100) (97,100)
Germany 61 85 93 97 98
(28,88) (69,95) (86,98) (93,99) (96,100)
Iceland 93 95 97 99 99
(53,100) (70,100) (83,100) (91,100) (96,100)
Ireland 89 88 91 95 97
(57,99) (60,99) (75,99) (84,99) (91,100)
Japan 7 35 38 75 85
(0,73) (8,85) (11,84) (50,93) (61,97)
Mexico 28 12 41 61 67
(1,89) (4,66) (18,75) (36,87) (43,94)
Portugal 64 82 87 92 95
(13,99) (46,98) (61,97) (73,98) (82,99)
Spain 37 52 72 87 94
(2,91) (17,93) (44,96) (73,98) (88,99)
United Kingdom 23 30 73 84 92
(1,72) (2,74) (57,87) (71,93) (82,97)
United States 80 91 95 97 99
(43,99) (70,99) (84,100) (90,100) (95,100)
Table 7: Percent of inflation variance attributed to a permanent inflation
shock. The 90 percent confidence bounds are in parentheses below each
point estimate. The horizon is in years.
28superneutrality akin to the countries in Group B. Intuitively, if (y) = 1 and
(fr) = 2, output may be afunction of the change in the rate of inflation, but
it cannot be a function of the level of inflation because that would imply
(y) = 2. The second country is Bolivia, for which we find (ir) = 1 and
(y) = 2. We again follow Fisher and Seater (1993, p. 404), who argue that
the long-run derivative is finite in this case only if their 7(1) = 0. This
condition is violated for the Bolivian data,31 and thus we conclude that
superneutrality is rejected for Bolivia. If we add Peru and Bolivia to our
findings for Groups A and B, we conclude that superneutrality describes
well the postwar experience of 21 of the 27 countries that are informative
on this question.
5.3 Implications for endogenous growth models
There is also the question of the effects ofhigher inflation on output growth
rates. As noted above, we are able to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in
output growth forall ofthe countries in Groups A and B; these countries did
experience permanent inflation shocks according to our tests. Thus these
25 countries provide considerable direct evidence in favor of superneutrality
with respect to output growth rates. This result is in contrast to some recent
claims that output growth rates are negatively related to inflation.32 If we
include the Group D countries, then Peru also provides direct evidence of
superneutrality with respect to output growth (since (y) = 1), while Bolivia
provides evidence against. We conclude that 26 of the 27 countries that
311f the sum ofthecoefficients on ~r in the ~~2yequation is equal to zero, then ~y(1)= 0.
We are able to reject this hypothesis for Bolivia.
32See, for instance, DeGregorio (1993) and Fischer (1991). We interpret our finding
as consistent with Gomme (1993), who estimates small effects of inflation on real output
growth rates in a simulation exercise. In addition, our finding is consistent with the
‘fragility’ results of Levineand Renelt (1992).
29are informative on thisquestion provide evidence in favor of superneutrality
with respect to output growth rates.
6 Summary
King and Watson (1992) have noted that little progress has been made on
testing superneutrality and related classical propositions since the Lucas-
Sargent rational expectations critique of the 1970s. In this paper we have
presented a test of superneutrality using minimal structure based on the
notion of permanent shocks to inflation. Our statistical model assumes that
money is long-run neutral (which is a necessary condition for superneutral-
ity) but allows the effects of permanentinflation shocks on thelevel of output
to be positive, zero, or negative. General equilibrium theories of money ex-
ist which are consistent with all three possibilities. We apply our test to
a set of countries which meet our standards with respect to data quality
and provide enough data to constitute a long run, and which also show ev-
idence of having experienced permanent inflation and output shocks. The
16 countries in this set are labelled Group A.
Our general result is that superneutrality seems to provide a good de-
scription of the postwar experience for most of the Group A countries. To
the extentthat superneutrality is violated, itis typicallyon the positive side,
apermanent increase ininflation being associated withapermanent increase
in the level ofoutput. We do find evidence of a statistically significant neg-
ative long-run response of the level ofoutput to a permanent inflation shock
for one country. Our point estimates of the long-run response ofoutput to
a permanent inflation shock are negatively related to the average in-sample
inflation rate of the Group A countries. That is, we tend to estimate high
30long-run responsesforrelatively low inflation countries, andzero or negative
responses for relatively high inflation countries.
Our nine Group B countries experienced permanent shocks to inflation
but no permanent shocks to the level of output. We interpret this as direct
evidence of superneutrality. We also find two additional special cases, one
of which provides evidence for and one of which provides evidence against
superneutrality. Ifwe add these results to those from Group A, we conclude
that long-run superneutrality provides a good description of the experience~
of 21 of 27 countries that are informative on this question.
Some results from endogenous growth models with money demand mo-
tivated via a cash-in-advance constraint suggest that a permanently higher
inilation rate would permanently lower the output growth rate. We inter-
pret all 25 countries in our Groups A and B as providing evidence against
this view. These countries have experienced permanent shocks to inflation
but no permanent shocks to output growth.
In thefour theoretical frameworks sketched to motivate our test, inflation
is always welfare reducing, and thus there seems to be little question of the
right policy choice in a world of homogeneous agents and no alternative
distortionary tax. To the extent that we find high estimates of the long-
run response of the level of output to a permanent inflation shock for low
inflation countries along with zero or negative estimates for high inflation
countries, our results could be interpreted as lending support to recent work
by Azariadis and Smith (1993), as their model predicts Mundell-Tobin effects
at low steady state inflation rates whichthen dissipate at higher steady state
inflation rates.
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